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Abstract
Scientific collaboration are becoming interdisciplinary,
and scientists are working in informal collaboration to
solve complex problems that require multiple types of
large resources. An option is a computational grid. A
computational grid is a distributed infrastructure that
appears to the end user as one large computing re-
source across organization boundaries. Grid technolo-
gies enable large-scale sharing of resources within for-
mal or informal consortia of individuals and/or insti-
tutions, usually called virtual organizations. In these
settings, the discovery, characterization, management,
and monitoring of resources, services, and computa-
tions can be challenging due to the considerable diver-
sity, large numbers, dynamic behavior, and geographi-
cal distribution of the entities in which a user might be
interested.
Trust is one of the biggest concerns in the grid re-
source management field. Grid systems can employ
reputation mechanisms in order to provide this essen-
tial trust, but not usually without incurring in certain
additional costs that negate the potential performance
gains offered by grid computing technologies. Moreover,
current reputation mechanisms are not appropriate for
resource management in large-scale systems (generally
used in P2P).
In this paper, we present a new reputation model for
resource management based on a economy model. Also
we demonstrate how it can by employed to add trust
into algorithms for grid scheduling. Finally, we sim-
ulate the proposed resource management algorithm in
order to verify its effectiveness.
Key Terms: grid resource management, economic
models, reputation models.
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1 Introduction
Needs of computational resources is increasing day
by day because of the universe of computationally in-
tensive tasks. For carrying out certain scientific exper-
iments, simulations, problem solving, capacity of single
stand alone machine is inadequate. Hence all organiza-
tions end up buying dedicated resources like supercom-
puters and mainframes with exorbitant costs. During
the last two decades the development of low cost power-
ful microprocessors and high speed computer networks
have promoted a change in the computing paradigm.
Today, big mainframes have been replaced by low cost
and highly powered collaborative infrastructure that
would make effective utilization of computational re-
sources owned by the organization. However, this po-
tential cannot be fully utilized unless the users are
able to transparently access these resources. By trans-
parency, we mean that the users should be able to ac-
cess any resource without worrying about (and indeed,
without being aware of) its physical location. This has
been the main motivation behind evolution of Resource
Management Systems (RMS).
The concept of grid computing has grown far be-
yond its original intent of linking supercomputing sites.
Through a web browser, a command line interface, or a
graphical desktop, users are able to view and select all
the grid resources and services in a virtual infinite ma-
chine room [29]. Building a grid requires the develop-
ment and deployment of a number of services, including
those for: resource discovery [47, 10, 24], scheduling
configuration management [43, 17], security [37, 36],
and payment mechanisms [1] in an open environment.
The complexity of the design of grid brokerage sys-
tem lies in the functionalities that such a system should
implement and in the characteristics that it should
have. These are:
• Ability to cope with the different ownerships of
resources and jobs.
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• Ability to define what optimal resource selection
means in regard to each actor (resource owners,
job owners, global welfare of the grid, optimal oc-
cupation of the resources, etc.) and offer different
solutions to different definitions of optimality.
• Ability to cope with the highly dynamic charac-
teristics of grid computing offering flexibility, scal-
ability and fault tolerance.
• Ability to interface with existing and foreseen grid
solutions.
• Ability to incentivise resource owners to put their
resources in the grid and jobs owners to submit the
jobs to the grid rather then buying more resources
on their own when an advantage is foreseen.
• Ability to cope with different scenarios ranging
from pure cooperation to pure competition.
• Capability to be implemented in small steps, al-
lowing the incremental composition of simple ser-
vices into more complex ones.
In grid resource management, various approaches
[28, 33, 26] have been used in several projects. Among
these, the management model based on computation
economy [18, 13] has been widely recognized because
of its improvement of the efficiency of management and
simplification of the complexity of resource scheduling.
The economy is an old, historical, sociological, and
mature system influencing many areas of human life.
Science describes and analyzes this system by the re-
search areas of political economics and business eco-
nomics. Economy is a driving factor which motivates
technological developments out of others as human
needs, both based on humans yearning.
Economic theory says that given a perfectly com-
petitive market, if the supply and demand functions
are homogeneous, continuous and obey Walras Law of
Markets, then there exists a equilibrium price point
for the entire market. In the area of computation eco-
nomic models, lots of research has been investigated,
which covers from economic models [15] and security
[35, 39] to GridBank [4]. Nevertheless, few works are
focused on the indirect reputation problem of grid re-
source management. To facilitate resource evaluation,
the concept of indirect reputation is proposed in this
paper. This idea reflects the essence of the resource,
that is, whether the resource can be treated as a re-
liable object. This concept applied to the Commodity
Market Model [16] is investigated in the rest of this
paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section introduces the background and related
work, summarizing the key ideas behind economic-
based market models. Section 3 provides the concept
of indirect reputation and its components. Section 4
describes the computation of the proposed model. Sec-
tion 5 proposes an indirect reputation resource schedul-
ing algorithm. Section 6 presents a simulation environ-
ment in order to analyze and validate the performance
of the indirect reputation model compared with other
approaches. Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions
and future work.
2 Background and Related Work
Market methods, sometimes called market oriented
programming in combination with Computer Science,
are used to solve the following problems which occur
in real scheduling environments ([19]):
• The site autonomy problem arises as the resources
within the system are owned by different compa-
nies.
• The heterogeneous substrate problem that results
from the fact that different companies use different
resource management systems.
• The policy extensibility problem means that local
management systems can be changed without any
effects for the rest of the system.
• The co-allocation problem addresses the aspect
that some applications need several resources of
different companies at the same time. Market
methods allow the combination of resources from
different suppliers without further knowledge of
the underlying schedules.
• The online control problem is caused by the fact
that the system works in an online environment.
The supply and demand mechanisms provide the
possibility to optimize different objectives of the mar-
ket participants under the usage of costs, prices and
utility functions. It is expected that such methods
provide high robustness and flexibility in the case of
failures and a high adaptability during changes.
Next, the definitions of market, market method and
agent will be presented briefly.
A market can be defined as a virtual market or
from an economical point of view as follows: “Gen-
erally any context in which the sale and purchase of
goods and services takes place.” [41]. The minimal
conditions to define a virtual market are: “A market
is a medium or context in which autonomous agents
exchange goods under the guidance of price in order to
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maximize their own utility.” [41]. The main aspect
is that autonomous agents exchange voluntarily their
goods in order to maximize their own utility.
A market method can be defined as follows: “A mar-
ket method is the overall algorithmic structure within
which a market mechanism or principle is embedded.”
[41]. It has to be emphasized that a market method is
an equilibrium protocol and not a complete algorithm.
The definition of an agent can be found in [41]: “An
agent is an entity whose supply and demand functions
are equilibrated with those of others by the mechanism,
and whose utility is increased through exchange at equi-
librium ratios.”. Details about the general equilibrium
and its existence can be found in [45].
The two key players driving the grid marketplace,
like in the conventional marketplace, are: Grid Ser-
vice Providers (GSPs) [9] providing the traditional role
of producers and Grid Resource Brokers (GRBs) [27]
representing consumers. The grid computing environ-
ments provide necessary infrastructure including se-
curity, information, transparent access to remote re-
sources, and information services that enable us to
bring these two entities together [14]. Consumers inter-
act with their own brokers for managing and schedul-
ing their computations on the grid. The GSPs make
their resources Grid enabled by running software sys-
tems (such as Globus) along with Grid resource Trad-
ing Services/Servers (GTS) to enable resource trading
and execution of consumer requests directed through
GRBs. The interaction between GRBs and GSPs dur-
ing resource trading is mediated through a Grid Market
Directory (GMD) [14].
A number of approaches have been proposed using
economic models to address resource usage and incen-
tives in a grid [21, 42, 30, 11]. Particularly, a well
designed market-based resource allocation mechanism
provides incentives for participation by ensuring that
all the actors in the system maximize their utility and
do not have incentives to deviate from the designed
protocol.
Economy-based resource management and schedul-
ing in computational grids was proposed and evaluated
in [12]. An important limitation to that work is the lack
of consideration given to data while scheduling jobs on
remote resources. [42] aimed to extend the deadline
and budget constrained cost and time minimization al-
gorithms proposed in [12] to data grids by removing
that limitation. These two algorithms are compared
with the proposed indirect reputation model in Sec-
tion 6. Here, we briefly mention some other typical
algorithms of economic models.
The WALRAS method is a classic approach by
translating a complex, distributed problem into an
equilibrium problem [8]. One of the assumptions is
that agents do not try to manipulate the prices with
speculation, which is called a perfect competition. To
solve the equilibrium problem the WALRAS method
uses a double auction. During that process all agents
send their utility functions to a central auctioneer who
calculates the equilibrium prices. A separate auction is
started for every good. At the end, the resulting prices
are transmitted to all agents. As the utility of goods
may not be independent for the agents, they can react
on the new equilibrium prices by re-adjusting their util-
ity functions. Subsequently, the process starts again.
This iteration is repeated until the equilibrium prices
are stabilized.
TheWALRAS method has been used for transporta-
tion problems as well as for processor rental. The trans-
portation problem requires to transport different goods
over an existing network from different start places to
different end places. The processor rental problem con-
sists of allocating one processor for different processes,
while all processes have to pay for the utilization.
Another application example for market methods is
the Enterprise [32] system. Here, machines create of-
fers for jobs to be run on these machines. To this end,
all jobs describe their necessary environment in detail.
After all machines have created their offers the jobs se-
lect between these offers. The machine that provides
the shortest response time has the highest priority and
will be chosen by the job. All machines have a prior-
ity scheme where jobs with a shorter run time have a
higher priority.
Reputation has been applied to a wide variety of
systems but currently, the research of trust models are
mainly focused on the area of electronic business (buy-
ers and sellers reputation), most products, such as eBay
[20], OnSale [34], Sporas and Histos [46], perform com-
prehensive evaluation according to the history data of
the bargainers that are judged and formed by the sat-
isfaction degree of users. The results of this approach
are local to the bargainers and vary with different bar-
gainers. This approach relies on a centralized system
to store and manage trust ratings. Another example
of this kind of model is the C-Net information portal,
which maintains an editors ranking on products and
resellers. However individual user responses are not
integrated in a correction of the editors ranking.
In the area of grid resource management, researchers
try to solve the trust problem [5, 38] in a similar way
and have achieved some results [46, 6]. But those works
basically migrate the evaluation methods from the area
of electronic business to the area of grid or P2P com-
puting.
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In the next sections we present our scheduling
method to add trust into algorithms for grid job
scheduling.
3 Indirect Reputation Model
3.1 Definition of Trust and Reputation
Trust is a psychological state in our society. The
capabilities of an individual (or organization) are so
limited that we must depend on and cooperate with
others in order to achieve various goals of our daily life
and businesses. This interdependence on each other
makes trust arise as one basic social glue unit, which
enables us to collaborate with others without fear, and
lets us use trust as a key element for successful conflict
resolution.
The notion of trust and reputation are complex sub-
jects related to a firm belief in attributes such as reli-
ability, honesty, and competence of the trusted entity.
There is a lack of consensus in the definition of them.
The definition of trust and reputation that we will use
in this paper is adopted from [22, 7].
Trust is the firm belief in the competence of an entity
to act as expected such that this firm belief is not a
fixed value associated with the entity but rather it is
subject to the entity’s behavior and applies only within
a specific context at a given time.
The direct reputation of an entity is an expectation
of its behavior based on other entities’ observations or
information about the entity’s past behavior at a given
time.
The definition of indirect reputation that we will use
in this paper is as follows: the indirect reputation of
an entity is an expectation of its behavior based on a
third party organization’s observations or information
about the entity’s past behavior at a given time.
Like trust and direct reputation, the indirect reputa-
tion is a dynamic value and spans over a set of values
ranging from very trustworthy state to very untrust-
worthy state. The indirect reputation is built on past
experience by a third party organization’s observations
and given for a specific context. When making indi-
rect reputation-based decisions, entities can rely on the
third party organization for information pertaining to
a specific entity. While direct reputation is a private
value between any two entities and varies with differ-
ent entities, indirect reputation is a unique and public
value in the grid administration domain.
3.2 Components of the Indirect Reputa-
tion
The indirect reputation algorithm is built on the Re-
source Usage Record (RUR) [23, 4]. RUR is a platform-
independent record (XML document) for resource ac-
counting data1. The RUR was developed as a co-
operative effort between the Global Grid Forum and
the GridBus Project. It is considered a common grid
middleware format that reflects the accounting princi-
ples involved in any kind of financial transaction. The
record may contain information about CPU time, stor-
age, or memory used (Table 1).
Resource Data User Data
host name / IP address host name / IP address
certificate name certificate name
host type
local job ID
wall clock time + price
user CPU time + price Job Data
system CPU time + price job ID
main memory + price application name
secondary storage + price job start date
I/O channels + price job end date
total price
Table 1. Resource Usage Record
Let x a resource identifier (resource certificate name)
defined by RUR, then the resource indirect reputation
Rr(x) is defined as follows:
Rr(x) = α ·Rr,cur(x) + β ·Rr,new(x)
Rr,new(x) = χ·
∑
i
(bio − bi)∑
i
bio
+δ·
∑
i
(tio − ti)∑
i
tio
i = 1, 2, . . .
In the equations above, α, β ≥ 0, α+β = 1, χ, δ ≥ 0,
χ+δ = 1, bio ≥ bi, tio ≥ ti, Rr,cur(x) means the current
value of resource indirect reputation, that is, the result
of latest evaluation. Rr,new(x) is the result of current
evaluation, which includes two factors: time and cost.
And bio is the budget value of each record and bi is
the actual cost. Similarly, tio is the estimative time
and ti is the actual cost. χ and δ are the contribution
rate of the cost and time to the indirect reputation
respectively. Finally, 0 ≤ Rr(x) ≤ 1, where Rr(x) =
1 means the best indirect reputation and Rr(x) = 0
means the worst one.
1XML allows RUR to be extended by each site to include
site-specific information.
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In the equation about Rr,new, the actual cost will
surpass the budget if bio < bi under certain resource
usage. Similarly, the time expended will surpass the
budget if tio < ti. Both of these two cases belong to
the breach of contract class. After having broken a
contract, the update method of resource indirect repu-
tation is defined as follows:
Rr(x) = (1− ε) ·Rr,cur(x) 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1
The indirect reputation is a function that varies with
time. If at certain time period greater than the eval-
uation period, there is a resource x that doesn’t pro-
duce the new Usage Record, then its indirect reputa-
tion function is as follows:
Rr(x) = (1− ϕ) ·Rr,cur(x) 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1
Obviously, if a resource doesn’t provide service for
the grid, its indirect reputation decreases as time goes
by.
4 Reputation Computation
4.1 Reputation Coefficient, Initial Value
and Update
The coefficient value embodies the corresponding
weight. To reflect the more important contribution of
the new-arriving scheduling to the indirect reputation,
the value of β should not be small. If χ > δ then the
proposed system concerns more about the scheduling
cost, otherwise the system will give more relevance to
the actual finish time of a resource.
The choice of initial indirect reputation value is
closely related to the resource’s behavior in the grid. If
a resource finds its indirect reputation value is smaller
than the initial value because of breach of contract, it
may choose to register again after having logged out.
Setting 0 as the initial indirect reputation value may
solve this problem, but on the other hand, this may
greatly depress the new-coming users and resources.
The approach that we have adopted is to delete a record
of breach of contract after having dealt with it, which
has no effects on the next evaluation. Besides, the in-
direct reputation value will be unconditionally smaller
than the initial indirect reputation value.
There are two approaches that can be used to update
the value of the indirect reputation: the event-driven
approach and the time-driven approach. Since the in-
direct reputation evaluation is not sensitive to the fea-
tures of performance and real-time, we believe that the
time-driven approach is more appropriate. The delet-
ing strategy we have adopted is as follows: deleting its
record if a resource has not logged in during a certain
time period (two months, for example). Deleting the
record of the resource provider means deleting all the
records of the resources it currently owns.
4.2 Algorithm Implementation
Let τ be the latest evaluating time, ∆τ be the inter-
evaluating time, and Rini(ri) be the initial value of
the resource ri, then the pseudo-code of the evaluation
algorithm is as follows:
while (CurrentTime = τ +∆τ)
collect RUR, price and cost data into
REM database
for all ri do
NewRep := IRE(ri,τ +∆τ)
if NewRep = -1 then
Rr(ri) := max[(1− ϕ)Rr,cur(ri), Rini(ri)]
if NewRep ≥ 1 then
for i:=1 to NewRep do
Rr(ri) := (1− ε)Rr,cur(ri)
Rr(ri) := max[Rr(ri), Rini(ri)]
endfor
else Rr(ri) := α ·Rr,cur(ri) + β ·NewRep
endfor
τ := CurrentTime;
Rr,cur := Rr(ri)
ReleaseResults
endwhile
The indirect reputation evaluation function is de-
fined as follows:
function IRE(ri,τ,τ +∆τ)
count := 0
S := RUR(ri,τ +∆τ)
if S = ∅ then
if TimeofFree + ∆τ ≥ TimeofDecrease
then
TimeofFree := 0
return -1
else for all records in S do
if (bio ≥ bi) and (tio ≥ ti) then
return χ ·
∑
i
(bio−bi)∑
i
bio
+ δ ·
∑
i
(tio−ti)∑
i
tio
for all records in S do
if (bio ≤ bi) or (tio ≤ ti) then
count := count + 1
return count
endif
endfunction
Where TimeofDecrease is the period in which the
indirect reputation value of certain resource decreases
because this resource has not been scheduled yet.
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TimeofFree is the total time counted during certain re-
source has not been scheduled, and count is the counter
for the records of breach of contract.
5 Indirect Reputation-Based Resource
Scheduling Algorithm
In order to satisfy the goal of minimizing the cost
and time, we have designed an indirect reputation-
based resource scheduling algorithm that can be ex-
pressed as follows:
1. Sort the resources that meet the task requirement
according to the indirect reputation value firstly,
then select m resources from the sorted list;
2. For the candidate list (m in length) obtained in
step 1, sort it by increasing cost and then select n
resources as the candidate resource set;
3. For each resource in candidate resource set (n in
length), calculate the next completion time for an
assigned job, taking into account previously as-
signed jobs.
4. Sort resources by next completion time.
5. Assign one job to the first resource for which the
cost per job is less than or equal to the remaining
budget per job.
6. Repeat all previous steps until all the jobs are as-
signed.
6 Analysis of Simulation Experiments
Before showing the experiments we will summarize
the key idea behind the algorithms used for compari-
son [15]:
Cost minimization. Jobs are executed in the sched-
ule that causes least expense while keeping the ex-
ecution time within the provided deadline.
Time minimization. Jobs are executed in the fastest
time possible with the budget for the execution
acting as the constraint.
The algorithm that implements the scheduling of a
set of jobs according to the above objective functions
is depicted in [42]. This algorithm is based on the Min-
Min heuristic discussed in [31].
To facilitate the comparison between our indirect
reputation-based algorithm, time-minimization algo-
rithm and cost-minimization algorithm [15, 42], we em-
ploy Nimrod/G 3.2.0 for GNU/Linux as the simulation
experiment platform. Nimrod/G is a resource manage-
ment system for scheduling computations on globally
distributed resources with varying QoS [3, 14, 2].
The simulation environment is composed of 100
nodes and each node provides a CPU resource in ei-
ther 2.0GHz or 2.5GHz (reasonable value for current
technologies, e.g. Intel Core 2 Duo desktop processors).
Besides, each node is not only a resource provider but
also a task host. The agent residing in the node ad-
ministers the resource and performs the model strat-
egy. Every task in the system owns running time of
100s by estimate and a budget of 2800G$2. To acquire
precise initial indirect reputation value, we adopt ran-
dom tasks scheduling strategy and control the running
time greater than 50 evaluation periods, assuring that
the indirect reputation evaluation has been performed
at least 50 times.
In the simulation experiment, we mainly focus
on the following aspects: throughput per time-unit,
turnover, rate of resource utilization and average fin-
ish time of task. The price of resources is classified by
indirect reputation ranking and price of 10, 12, 14, 16,
18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28 G$/s corresponds to indirect rep-
utation level (0, 0.1), [0.1, 0.2), . . ., [0.9,1) respectively.
In the indirect reputation-based scheduling algorithm,
parameters m and n are assigned as 5 and 3 respec-
tively. Our experiment results are achieved during 4
periods (/hour), these results are depicted in Tables 2
to Table 5.
As shown in Table 2, compared with the cost-
minimization algorithm and the time-minimization al-
gorithm, using the indirect reputation-based algorithm,
the system throughput has 5.5% enhancement and
1.8% enhancement respectively. In Table 3, time-
minimization gains the maximal transaction volume
and indirect reputation-based decreases a little, while
the cost-minimization algorithm decreases greatly. In
Table 4, the cost-minimization algorithm achieves the
average cost of 2378G$, while the indirect reputation-
based cost is 2482G$ and the time-minimization cost is
2545G$. As shown in Table 5, the indirect reputation-
based is the best in terms of both resource utilization
and rate of completed tasks, and its average finish time
is close to the time-minimization algorithm (1.2 sec-
onds behind).
According to the results presented, the indirect
reputation-based algorithm is the best one in terms
of throughput, rate of resource utilization and rate of
completed tasks. While in the aspects of turnover, av-
erage task finish time and average task cost, the pro-
posed indirect reputation-based is a tradeoff between
the time-minimization one and the cost-minimization
2G$ is the grid currency [4].
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one.
Algorithm name 1 2 3 4
Indirect Reputation 3241 3319 3261 3326
Cost Minimization 3106 3051 3140 3088
Time Minimization 3233 3281 3309 3257
Standard deviation 61.84 118.4 71.11 99.98
Table 2. Scheduling times per time-unit
Algo name 1 2 3 4
Indirect Rep 8101 8247 7929 8341
Cost Min 7239 7431 7143 7609
Time Min 8611 8361 8251 8491
Standard dev 566.23 414.16 465.37 385.32
Table 3. Transaction volume in different periods
(G$)
Algorithm name 1 2 3 4
Indirect Reputation 2501 2486 2433 2509
Cost Minimization 2332 2437 2276 2465
Time Minimization 2526 2550 2495 2608
Standard deviation 86.2 46.3 92.2 59.8
Table 4. Average task cost (G$)
Algorithm name Util(%) Com(%) Fin(s)
Indirect Reputation 87.4 98 83.6
Cost Minimization 84.3 92 92.5
Time Minimization 85.2 97 82.4
Standard deviation 1.30 2.62 4.50
Table 5. Resource utilization, completed rate and
average finish time
7 Conclusions and Future Work
Due to the expected scale of the grid computing sys-
tems, we need to develop highly distributed and exten-
sible resource management frameworks for such sys-
tems. The results of simulation experiments presented
in this paper validate the efficiency of the indirect rep-
utation evaluation model. It is feasible to establish
an indirect reputation architecture for the resources
and their service partners in the grid. This way, we
could not only constrain the behavior of Grid Service
Providers [9] and Grid Service Containers [40] but also
enhance the Quality of Services of the grid.
In the near future, we plan to extend our indirect
reputation architecture to multiple grid systems and
take up more resources, such as credit for the GridBank
[4], into our evaluation architecture. It is interesting to
review reputation systems for P2P with the purpose of
adopting its characteristics to grid computing [44] [25].
Also we want to integrate the evaluation mechanisms
employed in real life into our evaluation model, in order
to help the grid computation economics become more
practical.
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